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A Delicate Balance: Rethinking the
Physician’s Role in Physician Aid-in-Dying
Jaclyn Warwick*
This Note considers the current framework of states’ death with dignity laws and
analyzes physicians’ views of the legal standards to determine whether the current procedures
in death with dignity states adequately protect the patient’s interests. Aid in Dying (AID)
legislation attempts to balance individual privacy interests with state interests: obtaining an
ideal balance is the state legislature’s goal and is the topic of much advocacy. This Note
examines the current laws from a medical perspective and considers how physicians, as the
ones implementing the laws, view their role and the legislative safeguards.
Part I reviews the history of AID through Supreme Court cases and concludes that
AID is not a recognized constitutional right, and so legislation prohibiting or regulating
AID is within the discretion of state legislators. Part II examines the state interests that
are implicated by AID and physician concerns with legislation meant to protect those
interests. Part III provides suggestions that states could implement to address physician
concerns, including increased physician training, increased physician reporting requirements,
and increased government oversight.

* J.D., University of California, Irvine, School of Law, 2022. I would like to thank Professor Michele
Goodwin for her inspiration and guidance on this piece.
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INTRODUCTION
Physician aid-in-dying (AID) has become a hot topic in recent years.1 The
United States has historically criminalized all forms of suicide, including assisted
suicide.2 However, in 1997, Oregon became the first state to legalize AID in its
Death with Dignity Act.3 The enactment of this Act sparked vigorous debate within

1. Katheryn Houghton, Getting a Prescription to Die Remains Tricky Even as Aid-in-Dying Bills
Gain Momentum Across the U.S., TIME ( Mar. 29, 2021, 9:00 AM ), https://time.com/5950396/
aid-in-dying-2021/ [ https://perma.cc/WB2C-T3KY ]; Christian M. Wade, Emotional Pleas Heard
for Physician-Assisted Suicide, SALEM NEWS ( Oct. 4, 2021 ), https://www.salemnews.com/news/
emotional-pleas-heard-for-physician-assisted-suicide/article_b1f1f46a-22dd-11ec-9293-3352f3a698c0.html
[ https://perma.cc/6EYG-A39S ].
2. As a preliminary issue, physician aid-in-dying (AID ), or assisted suicide, must be
distinguished from euthanasia. Euthanasia is “the administration of a lethal agent by another person to
a patient for the purpose of relieving the patient’s intolerable and incurable suffering.” AM. MED. ASS’N,
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 5.8 (2016 ), https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2019-06/
code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-5.pdf [ https://perma.cc/3UT5-QZDQ ]. Euthanasia is separated into
active and passive euthanasia. See Alejandro Gutierrez-Castillo, Javier Gutierrez-Castillo, Francisco
Guadarrama-Conzuelo, Amado Jimenez-Ruiz & Jose Luis Ruiz-Sandoval, Euthanasia and
Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Systematic Review of Medical Students’ Attitudes in the Last 10 Years, 13
J. MED. ETHICS & HIST. MEDICINE, no. 22, 2020, at 1, 2. “Active euthanasia” involves a physician
administering a lethal dose of medication, and “passive euthanasia” involves withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment. Id. Physician aid-in-dying, on the other hand, occurs “when a physician facilitates a patient’s
death by providing the necessary means and/or information to enable the patient to perform the
life-ending act.” AM. MED. ASS’N, supra, at § 5.7 ( emphasis added ). The key distinction is that during
AID the patient themself ingests a lethal dose of medication, while euthanasia consists of another
person’s actions that affect the patient. The distinction implicates issues of mental competency and
agency and results in major legal differences. This Note will focus solely on AID.
3. Oregon, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/states/oregon/
[ https://perma.cc/BN3D-6K2Q ] (last visited Sept. 1, 2022 ).
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the legal, medical, and political fields regarding the appropriate reach and effect of
this type of legislation.4
Many scholarly articles and books thoroughly discuss whether AID should be
legalized in all fifty states. Proponents of AID argue that assisted dying should be
recognized as a fundamental right protected under the Liberty Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 They claim AID is a fundamental right because choosing
how to die while maintaining autonomy is extremely personal and an extension of
the right to privacy established in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade.6 Many
works have engaged in a constitutional analysis of AID laws, arguing that a patient’s
right to autonomy, choice, and control outweighs any state interest.7 Proponents of
AID claim that the ability to choose to die and end irreversible suffering should be
an option available to a limited population who meet certain qualifications.8
Opponents of AID have two major arguments: that killing, in any form, is wrong
and that legalizing AID opens the door to the risk of abuse through expansion of
AID medical procedures.9 Those with this view reference the long history of
criminalizing all forms of killing, arguing that all life is valuable and legalizing
assisted suicide would undercut the ethical foundation of law and medicine.10
This Note does not address whether AID should be legalized—other scholars
have discussed this question thoroughly11—and does not engage in an ethical
debate12 or a policy discussion. Rather, this Note focuses on assisted suicide as a
medical procedure. As with other medical procedures, proper state regulation of AID
involves balancing the state interests against the patient’s individual interests. AID
legislation includes safeguards, such as an age limit, mental capability requirement,

4. See generally EMILY JACKSON & JOHN KEOWN, DEBATING EUTHANASIA ( Peter Cane
ed., 2012 ); SUSAN STEFAN, RATIONAL SUICIDE, IRRATIONAL LAWS: EXAMINING CURRENT
APPROACHES TO SUICIDE IN POLICY AND LAW ( Patricia A. Zapf ed., 2016 ).
5. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Washington v. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1501 ( 2008 ); Katherine A. Chamberlain, Note, Looking for a “Good Death”: The Elderly
Terminally Ill’s Right to Die by Physician-Assisted Suicide, 17 ELDER L.J. 61 ( 2009 ).
6. See, e.g., Tom L. Beauchamp, The Right to Privacy and the Right to Die, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y
276, 287 ( 2000 ) ( arguing assisted suicide is a way to respect a person’s autonomy and privacy interests );
Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1507. Although the 2022 Supreme Court decision in Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health, 597 U.S. __ ( 2022 ), overturned Roe, the right to privacy remains intact through other
binding precedent cases including Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 ( 1965 ). It remains to be seen
how the Dobbs decision will affect the discourse involving the right to die.
7. See, e.g., Kathryn L. Tucker, In the Laboratory of the States: The Progress of Glucksberg’s
Invitation to States to Address End-of-Life Choice, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1593, 1606 ( 2008 ); Margaret
P. Battin, Physician-Assisted Dying and the Slippery Slope: The Challenge of Empirical Evidence, 45
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 91, 94 ( 2008 ).
8. See, e.g., John Coggon, The Wonder of Euthanasia: A Debate that’s Being Done to Death, 33
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 404 ( 2013 ) ( referencing JACKSON & KEOWN, supra note 4).
9. See Battin, supra note 7, at 95; Coggon, supra note 8, at 408.
10. Coggon, supra note 8, at 409 ( referencing John Keown’s argument in EUTHANASIA, ETHICS
AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST LEGISLATION ( 2002 ) ).
11. See sources cited supra notes 4, 7.
12. See Steven D. Smith, De-Moralized: Glucksberg in the Malaise, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1571
( 2008 ) ( discussing legal moralism in the context of assisted dying ).
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and licensing and reporting requirements for the physicians,13 that are meant to
ensure any application of AID happens in a reasonable, non-arbitrary manner.
However, as is the case with any regulation of a profession, legislators are not
experts—the practitioner is. It is physicians who are tasked with implementing
legislative policies in the field. Because physicians have the expertise and experience
with assisted dying policies, questions involving the appropriateness of legislative
regulations, the implementation of legislation, or the legislation’s integration with
or impediment of well-established medical practices should be answered by
physicians. Unfortunately, recent surveys of physicians reveal that most physicians
lack the training to make the medical judgments required by AID legislation,14
meaning the legislative process does not sufficiently protect individual patients
against arbitrary or unreasonable use of AID. At the same time, physicians are not
lawmakers, so their opinions must be considered in light of the broader context of
policy and social welfare that is the purview of legislators to achieve an ideal balance
of state and individual interests through AID regulation.
This Note considers physician qualifications, physician opinions on
legalization, and ongoing concerns regarding the implementation of the current
legislative framework.15 Part I briefly considers the legal history of AID and the
current legal authority. Part II analyzes the merits of a state’s interests in AID and
explains physician concerns with the relevant legislative safeguards. Part III
provides suggestions states can implement to address these concerns, including
additional procedural obligations that would increase physician reporting and
training requirements that fill legislative gaps. These suggestions rightfully place the
burden of preventing abuse on physicians, as physicians have the most power in the
physician-patient relationship and are the ones who determine whether a patient is
qualified for AID.

13. See e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.865, 127.855, 127.815, 127.885 ( 2020 ). Attending physicians
must ensure that all the documentation required by the statute is filled out and filed in compliance with
the law throughout the process of AID. The physicians must fill out and file compliance forms with
the Center for Health Statistics for each patient, and the Department of Human Services annually
reviews records regarding AID. See infra note 165.
14. Peter T. Hetzler III, James Nie, Amanda Zhou & Lydia S. Dugdale, A Report of Physicians’
Beliefs About Physician-Assisted Suicide: A National Study, 92 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 575, 581
( 2019 ); Leslie Kane, Life, Death, and Painful Dilemmas: Ethics 2020, MEDSCAPE ( Nov. 13, 2020 )
https://www.medscape.com/slideshow/2020-ethics-report-life-death-6013311 [ https://perma.cc/3LS4NHQL ].
15. Most of the concerns regarding the current framework revolve around the risk of abuse of
vulnerable populations. Battin, supra note 7, at 97–99. Scholars disagree on the extent to which these
risks have been realized in Oregon and other AID states, and there is not much empirical data by which
to form a satisfying conclusion. See generally Tucker, supra note 7 ( arguing that the Oregon legislative
safeguards sufficiently protect residents against abuse); Battin, supra note 7 ( relying on data collected
from Oregon to conclude there is no evidence of abuse of vulnerable groups ). But see Herbert Hendin
& Kathleen Foley, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Medical Perspective, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1613
( 2008 ) ( arguing that the available data is insufficient to form a conclusive opinion and legitimate
concerns remain regarding the safeguards ).
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I. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF PHYSICIAN AID IN DYING AND THE “RIGHT TO DIE”
There are three main Supreme Court cases that shaped the legal history of
AID and address the so-called “right to die” that is implicated by AID. First, in
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, the United States Supreme Court addressed
whether there is a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment (i.e., a “right to
die”).16 The Supreme Court ultimately found that the right to refuse medical
treatment could be found under the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection for
liberty,17 noting that intrusions into bodily autonomy, such as medical treatment,
implicate “substantial liberty interests.”18 However, it is a well-established principle
that individual liberty interests at times must yield to statutory regulation that serves
a legitimate state interest.19 Thus, to determine whether a patient’s constitutional
right to liberty has been violated, the Court balanced certain state interests against
the interests of the patient.20 Cruzan established that questions involving life and
death, and the associated medical treatment, are “deeply personal” and implicate
liberty interests that must be evaluated by balancing state interests and the patient’s
interests.21 While not addressing AID directly, Cruzan paved the way for the second
relevant Supreme Court case: Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997).
In 1997, the Supreme Court in Glucksberg directly addressed whether AID
should be recognized as a constitutional right under the Liberty Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.22 The Court again framed the question as one of
substantive due process, but instead of balancing the state interests with the
patient’s interests, the Court considered whether the right was “deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.”23 Pointing to centuries of history and tradition
that prohibited and criminalized suicide, the Court concluded the right to suicide
16. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269, 277 (1990 ). The
Court first addressed whether the right existed at all, then continued to analyze whether a mentally
incompetent person’s guardian could exercise that right for the incompetent person. Id. at 280. Around
the same time, there was national attention on the issue of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide
brought about by Dr. Jack Kevorkian, who illegally helped over a hundred people die. Melvin
I. Urofsky, Do Go Gentle into That Good Night: Thoughts on Death, Suicide, Morality, and the Law, 59
ARK. L. REV. 819, 826 ( 2007 ).
17. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905 ) ( upholding a state regulation that
allowed mandatory vaccinations ).
20. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271. The state interests articulated were the “preservation of life, the
protection of the interests of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and the maintenance of
the ethical integrity of the medical profession.” Id.
21. Id. at 281.
22. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997 ). Plaintiffs brought suit against
Washington State, arguing that the state’s ban on assisted suicide was unconstitutional on its face. The
plaintiffs argued that AID should be protected as a fundamental liberty right under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and any state legislation that limited or prohibited AID could not place an undue burden
on patients wishing to exercise their right.
23. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. The Court concluded the right at issue was whether there is a
constitutionally protected right to commit suicide, “which itself includes a right to assistance in doing
so.” Id. at 723.
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and the right to assisted suicide were not fundamental liberty interests.24 The
Glucksberg Court specifically distinguished AID from the refusal of medical
treatment found in Cruzan, holding that, although AID and the refusal of
medical treatment are both personal decisions, they are not legally protected in the
same way.25
Although some scholars argue Glucksberg was incorrectly decided and the
Supreme Court may overrule it in the future,26 it remains good law and AID—or
the right to die—is not a constitutionally protected privacy right. However, the third
Supreme Court case, Gonzalez v. Oregon, expressly authorized state legislatures to
legalize or criminalize AID by upholding the validity of Oregon’s Death with
Dignity Act.27 In Gonzalez, the Court held that state legislators had the authority to
define the scope of the medical profession, which included legalizing AID.28 The
Supreme Court recognized that states have the authority to legalize AID, even if
Glucksberg refused to recognize a fundamental right to die. Together, Gonzalez and
Glucksberg show that the legality, and thus the accessibility, of AID is a matter of
state law: state legislatures have the authority to either legalize or prohibit AID.29

24. Id. at 728. After concluding assisted dying was not constitutionally protected as a
fundamental right, the Court reviewed the Washington statute under a rational basis standard. Id.
Because there were several state interests implicated, the Court ultimately upheld the Washington
statutory ban on AID. Id.
25. Id. at 725.
26. Richard S. Myers, The Constitutionality of Laws Banning Physician Assisted Suicide, 31 BYU
J. PUB. L. 395, 396 ( 2017 ) ( pointing out that Obergefell v. Hodges, decided almost two decades later in
2015, used a different substantive due process analysis than Glucksberg—one that did focus on
autonomy—and using Obergefell’s divergence from history and tradition to argue that the Supreme
Court may reverse Glucksberg if given the chance ); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 5 ( arguing that
deciding how to die is integral to autonomy and should be considered a fundamental constitutional
right ). But see Yale Kamisar, Forward: Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look at the End of
Life and Personal Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1453 (2008 ) ( arguing that it is unlikely Glucksberg
will be overruled because it does not “stigmatize any politically vulnerable group” and recognizing a
constitutional right to AID would be difficult to define ).
27. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 ( 2006 ). A dispute arose regarding whether AID could
be considered a legitimate medical purpose. The Controlled Substances Act ( CSA ), a federal law that
classifies various substances, requires certain substances to only be issued “for a legitimate medical
purpose.” Id. at 254. Physicians acting in accordance with Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act prescribe
drugs that fall under Schedule II of the CSA; thus, these drugs must be used for a legitimate medical
purpose. In 2001, the U.S. Attorney General issued an Interpretive Rule of the CSA stating that assisting
suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose and physicians that did so would be in violation of the CSA.
Id. Oregon challenged this interpretation, and the Supreme Court ultimately struck down the
U.S. Attorney General’s Interpretive Rule and upheld Oregon’s definition of “legitimate medical
purpose.” Id. at 275.
28. Id. at 271, 275; see also Stephanie M. Richards, Death with Dignity: The Right, Choice, and
Power of Death by Physician-Assisted Suicide, 11 CHARLESTON L. REV. 471, 480–83 ( 2017 ) ( explaining
the Court’s reasoning as it applied to the Attorney General’s authority and the state’s authority to
regulate the medical field ).
29. See Urofsky, supra note 16, at 827.
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As of writing, nine states and the District of Columbia have legalized AID as
a medical procedure.30 Putting aside the states that still prohibit AID, the rest of
this Note will consider whether states that have legalized AID have done so in a
reasonable manner. Statutes that legalize AID attempt to strike a balance between
state and individual interests.31 The next Part will examine the various state interests
implicated in the regulation of AID, the legislation meant to balance those interests,
and physician concerns with the legislative requirements.
II. STATE INTERESTS IN REGULATING PHYSICIAN AID IN DYING AND RELATED
PHYSICIAN CONCERNS
Within the context of AID, the state’s interests are maintaining the integrity
of the medical profession, preserving life, protecting vulnerable residents, and
preventing a slippery slope.32 An individual patient’s interests are privacy and
maintaining dignity and autonomy in dying.33 AID legislation attempts to protect
both the state’s interests and the individuals’ interests. This Part will consider
whether physicians, as implementors of the legislation and administrators of AID,
believe that the legislation sufficiently achieves the balance it attempts to strike.
To begin, this Part examines the legislation and the steps states have taken to
safeguard patient interests. All AID states follow similar frameworks: AID patients
are limited to citizens of the state who are at least eighteen years old,34 have a
medical diagnosis of six months or less to live,35 and are mentally capable of making
the decision to seek AID.36 The patient must make two separate oral requests for

30. State Statute Navigator, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://deathwithdignity.org/
resources/state-statute-navigator/ [ https://perma.cc/2JGY-HKWT] ( last visited Sept. 1, 2022 )
( listing California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, New Jersey, Maine, New Mexico, Oregon,
Vermont, and Washington ).
31. See Richards, supra note 28, at 489.
32. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728–33 ( 1997 ).
33. There is much debate regarding what interests patients have in AID. For the purposes of
this Note, I will assume that the patient is interested in AID to maintain their control and
autonomy. See Kirsten Weir, Assisted Dying: The Motivations, Benefits, and Pitfalls of Hastening Death,
48 MONITOR ON PSYCH., no. 11, Dec. 2017, at 26; Angela Morrow, Reasons for Requesting
Physician-Assisted Suicide, VERYWELL HEALTH ( Mar. 23, 2020 ), https://www.verywellhealth.com/
reasons-for-seeking-physician-assisted-suicide-1132378?print [ https://perma.cc/AK2Q-NZGJ ].
34. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2018 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1( a ) ( West 2022 );
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.010( 1 ) ( 2008 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-102( 1 ) ( 2016 ); D.C. CODE
§ 7-661.01(13 ) (2017 ); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-1 ( West 2019 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 5281 ( 2013 ); 2021 N.M. Laws 132 § 2( A ) (2021 ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-3 ( West 2019 );
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.22, § 2140(2 )( A ) ( 2019 ).
35. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2018 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1( r ) ( West 2022 );
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.010( 13 ) ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-103( 1 )( a ) ( 2016 ); D.C. CODE
§ 7-661.01( 16 ); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-1 ( West 2019 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5281 ( 2013 );
2021 N.M. Laws 132 § 2( J ) (2021 ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-3 ( West 2019 ); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 2140(2 )( M ) ( 2019 ).
36. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 ( 2018 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5(a )( 1 ) ( West
2022 ); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.020 ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-103(1 )( b ) ( 2016 );
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-5 (West 2019 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5283( a )( 5 )( B ) ( 2013 ); 2021
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AID as well as a written request.37 The oral requests must be separated by a waiting
period,38 and the written request must be witnessed by two people, one of whom
must be an independent person (i.e., not related to the patient and not a beneficiary
after the patient’s death).39 The legislation tasks physicians with ensuring the patient
has made an informed decision,40 is free from undue influence,41 and is not
depressed or otherwise possessing impaired judgment.42 Physicians’ decisions are
confirmed by a second physician.43 Further, both physicians must file records

N.M. Laws 132 § 3( A ) ( 2021 ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-4 (West 2019 ); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 2140( 6 )( A ) (2019 ). The Oregon Act defines “capable” as having “the ability to make and
communicate health care decisions to health care providers.” OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2018 ).
Similarly, the California Act defines “capacity to make medical decisions” as the “ability to understand
the nature and consequences of a health care decision, the ability to understand its significant benefits,
risks, and alternatives, and the ability to make and communicate an informed decision to health care
providers.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1( e ) ( 2022 ).
37. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.840 (2020 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.3( a ) ( West 2022 );
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.090 ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-104( 1 ) ( 2016 ); D.C. CODE
§ 7-661.02( a ) ( 2017 ); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-2 ( West 2019 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5283( a )
( 2013 ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-10.a ( West 2019 ); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2140( 11 ) ( 2019 ).
38. Most waiting periods are fifteen days. OR. REV. STAT § 127.850 ( 2020 ); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.245.110 ( 2009 ) ( a proposed amendment to the Washington statute provides for a waiting
time of seventy-two hours. H.B. 1141, 2021 Leg., 2021 Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2021 ) ); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 25-48-104(1 ) ( 2016 ); D.C. CODE § 7-661.02( a ) ( 2017 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5283( a ) ( 2013 );
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-10.a ( West 2019 ); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 2140( 11 ). In an
amendment effective January 1, 2022, California changed the waiting period from fifteen days to two
days. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.3( a ) ( West 2022 ); S.B. 380, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022
Reg. Sess. ( Cal. 2021 ); Bernard J. Wolfson, New California Law Eases Aid-in-Dying Process,
CAL. HEALTHLINE ( Dec. 3, 2021, 1:00 PM ), https://californiahealthline.org/news/article/
new-california-law-eases-aid-in-dying-process/ [ https://perma.cc/45NK-CEU3 ]. Hawaii has a
waiting period of twenty days, but a bill has been proposed to change it to fifteen days.
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-9 ( 2019 ); S.B. 839, S.B. 839, 31st Leg., 2021 Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2021 ).
39. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.810 ( 2022 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.3( b )( 3 ) ( West
2022 ); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.030 ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-104( 2 ) ( 2016 ); D.C. CODE
§ 7-661.02( b )( 1 ) ( 2017 ); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-3 (West 2019 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 5283(a ) (2013 ); 2021 N.M. Laws 132 § 3( H ); N.J. S TAT . A NN . § 26:16-5 ( West 2019 );
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2140( 5 )( C ) ( 2019 ).
40. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.830 ( 2022 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5(a )( 2 ) ( West
2022 ); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.070 ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-110 (2016 ); D.C. CODE
§ 7-661.03( a )( 9 ) ( 2017 ); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-7 (West 2019 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 5283( a )( 5 )( C ) ( 2013 ); 2021 N.M. Laws 132 § 2( C ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-7 ( West 2019 );
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 2140( 9 ) ( 2019 ).
41. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815 ( 2020 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5( a )( 4 ) ( 2022 );
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.040( 1 )( d ) ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-106( 1 )(g ) ( 2016 );
D.C. CODE § 7-661.03( a )( 1 )( C ) ( 2017 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5283(a )( 5 )( D ) ( 2013 ); 2021
N.M. Laws 132 § 2( D ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-6 ( West 2019 ); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 2140(6 )( E ) ( 2019 ).
42. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825 (2022 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5( a )( 1 )( A )( iii )
( West 2022 ); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.060 ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-108 ( 2016 );
D.C. CODE § 7-661.04 ( 2017 ); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-6 ( West 2019 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18
§ 5283( a )( 8 ) (2013 ); 2021 N.M. Laws 132 § 4; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-8 ( West 2019 ); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 2140( 8 ) ( 2019 ).
43. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.820 ( 2022 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5(a )( 3 ) ( West
2022 ); WASH. REV. CODE §70.245.040( 1 )( d ) ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-107 (2016 );
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of the patient’s requests, the diagnosis, the determination that the patient met
the qualifications, and any other medical documentation made throughout
the process.44
On their face, these many legislative safeguards seem to guarantee that
individuals who die from AID have done so through a careful, precise process that
appropriately balances individual autonomy with the state interests in preserving life
and protecting vulnerable populations. In reality, however, there is an ongoing
debate among scholars45 and physicians46 regarding whether the safeguards actually
achieve a proper balance.
A. Maintaining the Integrity of the Medical Profession
The first state interest implicated by AID is ensuring the integrity of the
medical profession. This is possibly the most complicated interest brought up by
the Glucksberg Court because it involves defining the scope and purpose of an entire
profession. Gonzales upheld a state’s regulation of medicine, implying that the state
legislature is best suited to establish these boundaries.47 While the legislative process
may realistically be the best manner by which to establish legal guidelines and
safeguards, input from medical professionals is essential to truly understand
whether AID should fall within the scope of the medical field and how it should be
implemented. Therefore, this Note considers recent surveys of physicians’ opinions
on AID and whether it is appropriately legalized as a medical procedure.
1. Arguments in Opposition to AID as a Medical Procedure
There are two main arguments against establishing AID as a legitimate medical
procedure: first, that medicine is the art of healing and assisting dying is
diametrically opposed to that purpose, and second, that authorizing physicians to
D.C. CODE § 7-661.03( a )( 3 ) ( 2017 ); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-5 ( West 2019 ); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 5283( a )(7 ) ( 2013 ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-6.a( 4 ) ( West 2019 ); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 2140(7 ) ( 2019 ).
44. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.855; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5( a )( 10 )–( 11 ) ( West
2022 ); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.120 ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-111 (2016 ); D.C. CODE
§§ 7-661.05, 7-661.06 ( 2017 ); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-12 ( West 2019 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 5283( a )( 14 )–( 15 ) ( 2013 ); 2021 N.M. Laws 132 § 9; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-10.d (West 2019 );
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §2140(14 ) (2019 ).
45. See Tucker, supra note 7, at 1603 ( “The experience in Oregon has demonstrated that a
carefully drafted law does not place patients at risk.” ); Battin, supra note 7, at 104 ( arguing empirical
data collected from Oregon shows no evidence of abuse of vulnerable populations ). But see Hendin
& Foley, supra note 15, at 1614 ( “The evidence strongly suggests that these safeguards are circumvented
in ways that are harmful to patients.” ); Wendy E. Hiscox, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: The
‘Death with Dignity’ Data, MED. L. INT’L 197, 199 ( 2007 ) ( “Further inquiry, however, suggest that the
safeguards are largely ineffective.” ); José Pereira, Legalizing Euthanasia or Assisted Suicide: The Illusion
of Safeguards and Controls, 18 CURRENT ONCOLOGY, at e38, e38 ( 2011 ).
46. Hetzler et. al, supra note 14; Polling on Voter Support for Medical Aid in Dying, COMPASSION
& CHOICES ( Feb. 24, 2022 ), https://compassionandchoices.org/resource/polling-medical-aid-dying/
[ https://perma.cc/X95A-ARNT ].
47. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270–71 ( 2006 ).
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assist dying would detrimentally affect the physician-patient relationship.48 The first
argument, articulated in Glucksberg and Gonzales, is based on the traditional
understanding of medicine and the fear that physician cooperation in assisted dying
would undermine the medical purpose of healing.49 In fact, the American Medical
Association filed an amicus brief to the Glucksberg Court in 1996, arguing against
finding a constitutional right to AID.50 The brief states, “[t]he power to assist in
intentionally taking the life of a patient is antithetical to the central mission of
healing that guides [the medical profession].”51 Consider the original Hippocratic
Oath, written in the fifth century B.C. by ancient Greek healers, in which physicians
swear not to “prescribe a deadly drug” or otherwise aid a patient in dying.52 If one
accepts the view that the bounds of medicine include only healing, then it follows
that AID would fall outside the medical profession. However, the definition of
medicine is not so clear-cut.
With the passage of time, physicians’ understanding of “do no harm” has
evolved. The modern Hippocratic Oath, as written in 1964, does not include the
language in the original that bans physicians from prescribing deadly drugs.53
Instead, the Oath states, “If it is given me to save a life, all thanks. But it may also
be within my power to take a life; this awesome responsibility must be faced with
great humbleness.”54 The changes to the Hippocratic Oath reflect a common
theme: the understanding of the purpose and scope of medicine and the physician’s
role evolve with time and the advancement of technology.55 These changes cause
even more questions about the proper scope of the medical profession, questions
that are implicated in the AID discussion. As will be discussed below, recent studies

48. Chamberlain, supra note 5, at 81–82.
49. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 272; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 ( 1997 ).
50. Brief of Am. Med. Ass’n, Am. Nurses Ass’n, & the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 ( 1997 ) (No. 96-110 ),
1996 WL 656263, at *1.
51. Id; see also Daniel P. Sulmasy, Ilora Finlay, Faith Fitzgerald, Kathleen Foley, Richard Payne
& Mark Siegler, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Why Neutrality by Organized Medicine Is Neither Neutral
Nor Appropriate, 33 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1394, 1396 ( 2018 ) ( “Medicine’s central task is to
heal . . . it makes no sense to claim that patients have been healed by having assisted them in ending
their lives.” ).
52. Physician Oaths, AAPS, https://www.aapsonline.org/ethics/oaths.htm#lasagna [ https://
perma.cc/LRC3-PNY4 ] ( last visited Sept. 1, 2022 ).
53. Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, PBS SOCAL: NOVA ( Mar. 26, 2001 ), https://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/hippocratic-oath-today/ [ https://perma.cc/BHW7-B5X8 ].
54. Id.
55. Another significant change to the Hippocratic Oath is the removal of language that
prohibits physicians from assisting in abortion. The original Oath swears not to “give a woman a pessary
to procure abortion,” Physician Oaths, supra note 52, but that language is completely removed in the
modern version, replaced with the language regarding life and death, Tyson, supra note 53. The modern
version of the Oath was written in 1964, id., showing how changes in public sentiment and professional
actions result in the evolution of formal professional standards, such as the Oath. More to the point,
currently, public sentiment and professional actions are changing regarding AID, and if the same pattern
occurs as it did regarding abortion, professional standards regarding AID may soon change as well.
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show that physician opinions on AID are changing, mirroring the recent trend in
public sentiment to legalize AID.56
The second argument against including AID as a legitimate medical purpose
is the idea that the foundation of the physician-patient relationship is the trust the
patient has in the physician to cure them.57 As law professor Melvin Urofsky put it,
“Medical ethicists and others worry that if the doctor becomes a dispenser of death,
this will adversely affect the doctor-patient relationship, destroying the trust that is
essential to good care.”58 Those with this concern do not want to encourage patients
to seek out AID when other treatments are available.59 Once again, accepting this
argument requires defining the purpose of medicine in a very specific way, one
which may not be appropriate to every physician-patient relationship. Each patient
has individual needs and goals, and a physician has an obligation to do what is in
the best interests of the patient. Terminally ill patients may expect and desire their
physician to explain all of their end-of-life (EOL) options, including AID.
As long as physicians communicate and fully explain to their patients what
EOL options are available, it is unlikely the physician-patient relationship would be
damaged. However, it is essential to guarantee that the patient understands the
different types of EOL care available, and the physician is best suited to ensure this
information is imparted.60 If the patient understands all the EOL options and still
chooses to seek AID, “a physician who assists suicide does not undermine the
doctor-patient relationship because such care fulfills her patient’s wishes and
maintains, not violates, her patient’s trust.”61 In fact, a serious discussion about AID
as an option for terminally ill patients “demonstrate[s] a commitment to the
patient’s well-being right up until the moment of death,” a commitment consistent
with the physician’s role.62
This broader definition of the physician’s role means that AID is not outside
the realm of medical practice. Additionally, even with this broader definition of

56. See, e.g., Hetzler et al., supra note 14, at 577. For statistics on Americans’ opinions about
assisted dying, see COMPASSION & CHOICES, supra note 46 ( showing results of Medscape and Gallup
polls that conclude 74% of residents and 55% of physicians agree that medical aid in dying should be
legalized ); see also Megan Brenan, Americans’ Strong Support for Euthanasia Persists, GALLUP ( May 31,
2018 ), https://news.gallup.com/poll/235145/americans-strong-support-euthanasia-persists.aspx
[ https://perma.cc/T7JW-BVSE] ( showing that in 2018, 65% of Americans thought AID should
be legalized ).
57. Sulmasy et al., supra note 51, at 1396; Chamberlain, supra note 5, at 81–82.
58. Urofsky, supra note 16, at 832.
59. Sulmasy et al., supra note 51, at 1396.
60. David Orentlicher, Thaddeus Mason Pope & Ben A. Rich, Clinical Criteria for Physician
Aid in Dying, 19 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 259, 260 ( 2016 ) ( listing the different EOL care available: hospice,
management of symptoms, discontinuing life-prolonging treatment, palliative sedation to
unconsciousness, and voluntarily ceasing to eat or drink ); see also AM. MED. ASS’N, Opinions on Caring
for Patients at the End of Life, in AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 2.
61. Chamberlain, supra note 5, at 82.
62. Urofsky, supra note 16, at 833.
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medicine, physicians are under no obligation to actively participate in AID.63 All
AID statutes explicitly say that no health care provider is required to participate in
AID, rather, it is entirely voluntary.64 Physicians are not subject to any liabilities for
participating or refusing to participate. Therefore, if both physician and patient are
not opposed to AID, then there is no reason to assume physician participation in
AID would destroy trust.
In short, both arguments in opposition to AID as a legitimate medical
procedure are based on premises that are not universal—that medicine is the art of
healing only and that AID undermines the physician-patient relationship as doctors
become “dispensers of death.”65 Both physicians and patients can, and do, disagree
with these premises. In fact, recent surveys of physicians show a clear difference of
opinion on whether AID should be legalized.
2. Physician Views on AID Remain Divided
Medical professionals are fiercely divided on the topic of physician aid in
dying. Some hold to the traditional view that hastening death is incompatible with
the role of the physician, while others believe that AID is an appropriate medical
purpose. The American Medical Association (AMA) recognizes the differences in
opinion, stating that “[t]houghtful, morally admirable individuals hold diverging, yet
equally deeply held, and well-considered perspectives about physician-assisted
suicide.”66 Regardless of a physician’s position on AID, the AMA continues on to
assure the public that both “supporters and opponents share a fundamental
commitment to values of care, compassion, respect, and dignity.”67
Recent studies have shown that physician opinions about AID are slowly
becoming more favorable, though clear division still remains.68 A study done by
Medscape in 2020 asked 5,130 U.S. doctors whether AID should be legalized for
terminally ill patients.69 Fifty-five percent of the doctors said “yes,” 17% said “no,”

63. Id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1511 ( “Each doctor can and would decide for himself or
herself whether to assist a person in dying.” ).
64. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.885( 4 ) ( 2003 ) ( “No health care provider shall be under any
duty . . . to participate in the provision . . . of medication [ to AID patients ].” ); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 327L-19 ( West 2019 ); D.C. CODE § 7-661.10 ( 2017 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5285 (2013 );
COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-117 (2016 ) ( “A health care provider may choose whether to participate in
providing medical aid-in-dying to an individual in accordance with this article.” ); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 443.14( e ) ( West 2022 ) (“Participation under this part shall be voluntary.” );
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-17.c (West 2019 ); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.190 ( 2009 ) (“Only willing
health care providers shall participate in the provision to a qualified patient of medication to end his or
her life in a humane and dignified manner.” ); 2021 N.M. Laws 132 § 7( C ) ( “No health care provider
who objects . . . shall be required to participate in [ AID ].” ); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2140( 21 )
( 2019 ) (“Nothing in this Act requires a health care provider to provide medication.” ).
65. Urofsky, supra note 16.
66. AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 5.7.
67. Id.
68. Hetzler et al., supra note 14; COMPASSION & CHOICES, supra note 46.
69. Kane, supra note 14.
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and 28% said it would depend on the situation.70 This is a 9% increase over the
response in 2010, where 46% of doctors supported medical aid in dying.71 Similarly,
in a 2019 survey of 188 doctors, 60% thought AID should be legalized and 69%
thought it should be decriminalized.72 However, only 25% of respondents indicated
they would be willing to perform AID, either because of religious/spiritual beliefs
or a lack of training.73 Furthermore, only 49% agreed that the medical profession
should endorse AID as a “morally valid medical option,” drawing a distinction
between legalization and moral endorsement of AID.74 While this particular study
had a small sample size, when combined with the Medscape survey, it is clear that
physicians are deeply divided on the topic of AID.
The change in physician opinion to be more favorable towards AID parallels
recent trends in voter support. A 2018 Gallup poll of American voters showed
65% of respondents believed AID should be legalized.75 Approval for AID and
euthanasia has steadily increased since 1966 when voters were first polled on this
issue (the approval rate was 52% at that time).76 However, because the medical field
remains so divided and public opinion is changing so slowly, there is no clear
conclusion to be drawn as to whether AID should be considered a legitimate
medical purpose on a national level. Thus, deference to the democratic process
through state legislation—as held in Gonzales—is still appropriate.77 Unfortunately,
a recent study of physicians shows that the current legislative framework is
ineffective, and the medical profession has strong concerns about how the states go
about protecting their interests and the interests of AID patients.78
B. Preserving Life
As a threshold matter, for the purposes of weighing a state’s interest, it is
imperative to distinguish between suicide per se and AID. AID is more complicated
than suicide per se, as it involves hastening a death that will naturally occur relatively
soon. As such, the state interest implicated is not one of preventing suicide, but of
preserving the life of terminally ill individuals until death naturally occurs.79

70. Id.
71. COMPASSION & CHOICES, supra note 46.
72. Hetzler et al., supra note 14, at 577.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 581 tbl.4; see also Brenan, supra note 56 ( “A slim majority of Americans ( 54% ) currently
think doctor-assisted suicide is morally acceptable, and 42% think it is morally wrong.” ); Moral Issues,
GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1681/moral-issues.aspx [ https://perma.cc/RSC4-SKDQ ]
( last visited Aug. 26, 2022 ) ( showing results from a 2020 poll that 51% of respondents believe
doctor-assisted suicide is morally acceptable ).
75. Brenan, supra note 56.
76. Id.
77. This deference does not impose unwanted obligations on physicians because physicians are
not required to participate in AID. See sources cited supra note 64.
78. See, e.g., Hetzler et al., supra note 14.
79. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1510 ( “[ T ]he question is much more specific: does the
state have a compelling interest in preventing terminally ill patients from being assisted in their death?
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Therefore, my analysis will focus on the interest in preserving life, with the
understanding that in this context the prevention of suicide per se is not relevant to
this discussion.
It is well-established that states have a legitimate interest in preserving
the life of residents. This can be seen through the history of U.S. laws that
criminalize actions that result in death.80 For instance, in Cruzan, the Supreme
Court pointed out that “[a]s a general matter, the States—indeed, all civilized
nations—demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious
crime.”81 Additionally, suicide per se was a crime in the English courts during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a view that was adopted in the American
colonies and persisted for many years.82 Although suicide per se has been
decriminalized, the state’s interest in life continues to be shown through courts’
condemnation of suicide as a “public wrong” and through laws that ban assisting
suicide.83 As shown in Glucksberg, the United States has a long history of prohibiting
assisted suicide.84
While it is obvious states have an interest in preserving life, it is important to
note that this interest is not absolute. There are qualifications and exceptions to the
preservation of life that make it clear the state’s interest can be outweighed by
other interests. For instance, the most obvious qualification has been discussed
above: the Cruzan Court held it acceptable for life-sustaining treatment to be
withheld from patients.85 Voluntary refusal of medical treatment is naturally
antithetical to the preservation of life, yet the state interest yielded in favor of
autonomy.86 In Cruzan, the Court acknowledged that the strength of a state’s

Phrased this way, the argument collapses into the prior point that the state has a compelling interest in
safeguarding life.” ).
80. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111–1112 ( criminalizing homicide and manslaughter ).
81. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990 ).
82. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711–12 ( “[ F]or over 700 years, the
Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and
assisting suicide.” ).
83. Id. at 714.
84. Id. at 715–19 ( “Attitudes toward suicide itself have changed since [ English common-law ],
but our laws have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide.” ).
85. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
86. Many proponents of AID argue that the distinction between removing life-sustaining
treatment and prescribing medication for assisted dying is unreasonable. See, e.g., Coggon, supra note 8,
at 406; Chamberlain, supra note 5, at 72 (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s distinction between refusing
life-sustaining treatment and physician-assisted suicide is both arbitrary and unconstitutional.” ). There
are other laws in the United States that show the state’s interest in life is not unqualified. For instance,
despite a majority of states prohibiting homicide ( and, historically, suicide ), there are also laws allowing
capital punishment. Today, the death penalty is still legal in twenty-seven states, the federal government,
and the military. D EATH P ENALTY I NFO . C TR ., F ACTS ABOUT THE D EATH P ENALTY (2022 ),
https://documents.deathpenaltyinfo.org/pdf/FactSheet.pdf [ https://perma.cc/B7DS-HWUL].
Granted, the circumstances surrounding the death penalty are very different than those involving
AID—the criminal context of punishment versus the medical context of autonomy in dying—but
nevertheless the persistence of capital punishment shows that there are, and have been, circumstances
where a state’s interest in preserving life is outweighed by other interests.
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interest in preserving life fluctuates depending on the context. The state’s interest is
“greatest when an affliction [is] curable”87 and weakens as “the prognosis dims.”88
Within the context of AID, the state strikes a balance between its interest in
preserving life and preserving individual autonomy by requiring patients seeking
AID to have a prognosis of at most six months to live.89 This requirement takes
into consideration the fact that the state interest is likely weak, as the “affliction[s]”
in question are not “curable,” but the strict regulations still preserve the life of
citizens until the final months. However, physicians have articulated doubts
regarding whether a six-month diagnosis can be made accurately. In a national
survey of physicians, only 18% of physician respondents agreed that physicians can
“predict with certainty” whether a patient has six months or less to live.90 Similarly,
Berger and Terry, representing organizations that work on behalf of those with
disabilities, expressed a concern that it is “nearly impossible” to accurately predict
the time of death, pointing to disabled persons who have lived for years after an
inaccurate diagnosis.91
In practice, the 2020 data summary from Oregon shows 3.3% of patients
(8 of 245) who died from lethal medication outlived the six-month prognosis.92 That
is, they received the medication but did not take it immediately, and then outlived
the six-month estimated prognosis. Obviously, this does not show how many
people who did ingest the medication would have lived longer than six months.93
Vermont notes that 4 of 52 patients likely survived past the 2019 reporting period,
as the Health Department had not received a death report for those patients.94
Similarly, Washington notes that its Department of Health did not receive the death
certificates of 12 of 334 patients in 2020.95 In its 2020 report, Colorado reports
a maximum time duration between prescription and date of death of eleven

87. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271.
88. Id. at 270 (quoting In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 ( N.J. 1976 ) ).
89. See sources cited supra note 35.
90. Hetzler et al., supra note 14, at 581; see also Hendin & Foley, supra note 15, at 1633 ( “The
majority of Oregon physicians, when surveyed, were not confident they could make [ an accurate ]
prediction [ of six months or less to live].” ); Hiscox, supra note 45, at 199.
91. Helena Berger & Clyde Terry, When Insurance Companies Refuse Treatment
“Assisted Suicide” Is No Choice at All, AAPD ( Jan. 24, 2017 ), https://www.aapd.com/
when-insurance-companies-refuse-treatment-assisted-suicide-is-no-choice-at-all/ [ https://perma.cc/SR4J339Z ].
92. PUB. HEALTH DIV., CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT
2020 DATA SUMMARY 11 ( 2021 ) [ hereinafter OR. DATA SUMMARY ].
93. See Robert Preston, Physician-Assisted Suicide—A Clean Bill of Health? 123 BRIT. MED. BULL. 69,
74 ( 2017 ) ( noting that the period between the first request for AID and death from ingestion is
sometimes more than six months ).
94. AGENCY OF HUM. SERVICES, VT. DEP’T OF HEALTH, REPORT CONCERNING PATIENT
CHOICE AT THE END OF LIFE 4 ( 2018 ) [ hereinafter VT. DATA SUMMARY ].
95. CTR FOR HEALTH STAT., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 2020 DEATH WITH DIGNITY
ACT REPORT 13 ( 2021 ) [ hereinafter WASH. DATA SUMMARY ].
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months.96 Further, data from California includes individuals who were prescribed
the medication in prior years but ingested it in the most recent report.97 Though the
prescription date is not reported, it is likely at least some of those patients outlived
the six-month diagnosis. After all, if the medication was prescribed in 2018, but the
patient did not die until the medication was ingested in 2019, there is a likelihood
that the time between prescription and ingestion was more than six months.
On the other hand, data collected from states that have legalized AID and that
record the cause of death shows the percentage of individuals who died of their
underlying illness before ingestion of drugs (and before the six-month prognosis).
California reports 14.6% of those seeking AID died from the underlying disease,98
Hawaii reports 34.8%,99 Vermont 35%,100 Washington 12.2%,101 and Oregon
18%.102 Thus, the data shows that there is evidence of patients dying before and
after the predicted six-month timeline. This means that the current regulation may
or may not appropriately balance the state interest in preserving life with individual
interest in autonomy and dignity in dying.
Unfortunately, there is little the state can require that would increase accuracy
or certainty of patients’ prognoses. Diagnosis and prognosis are wholly within the
scope of the physician’s expertise, and state action cannot decrease the margin of
error. However, this uncertainty about accuracy is an important point to take note
of when drafting legislation: a shorter prognosis requirement, such as a three-month
prognosis, may be appropriate to reduce the risk of ending life prematurely. This
type of decision is one for the democratic process and is beyond the scope of the
discussion here. For the purposes of this Note, the important fact is that physicians
have noted a concern, backed up by data, that the required six-month diagnosis is
not always accurate. This means that the current legislative framework may not be
properly protecting the state’s interest in preserving life.
C. Protecting Vulnerable Populations
The next state interest implicated by AID is protecting vulnerable populations
against abuse of AID. The concern is that vulnerable populations—particularly the
elderly, disabled, and poor—might be pressured to seek AID when alternative

96. CTR. HEALTH & ENVIRON. DATA, COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENVIRON.,
COLORADO END-OF-LIFE OPTIONS ACT, YEAR FOUR 2020 DATA SUMMARY, WITH 2017-2020
TRENDS AND TOTALS 4 ( 2020 ) [ hereinafter COLO. DATA SUMMARY ].
97. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, CALIFORNIA END OF LIFE OPTION ACT 2019
DATA REPORT 3 ( 2020 ) [ hereinafter CAL. DATA SUMMARY ] ( noting that thirty-four individuals with
prescriptions from prior years ingested the medication during 2019 ).
98. Id.
99. OFFICE OF PLAN., POL’Y & PROGRAM DEV., DEP’T OF HEALTH, REPORT TO THE
THIRTIETH LEGISLATURE STATE OF HAWAII 1 (2020 ) [ hereinafter HAW. DATA SUMMARY ].
100. VT. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 94, at 4.
101. WASH. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 95, at 5.
102. OR. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 92, at 5.
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methods of EOL care are available.103 The Glucksberg Court stated there was a “real
risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations.”104 Specifically,
the Court worried that the elderly, poor, or disabled would feel pressured to seek
out AID “to spare their families the substantial financial burden of end-of-life
health-care costs.”105 The Court decried this potential undue influence, asserting
that the “suicidal impulses” of these populations should “be interpreted and treated
the same way as anyone else’s.”106 In other words, the state fears that the desire of
vulnerable individuals to seek AID could be motivated by external pressures, such
as familial or financial influence, rather than a genuine desire for autonomy in dying.
To alleviate this fear, AID legislation requires that physicians ensure patients make
an informed decision,107 are free from undue influence,108 and are not afflicted by
impaired judgment.109
Proponents of AID rely heavily on data that shows patients using AID are
generally insured and highly educated to rebut the risk of coercion.110 The argument
seems to assume that educated patients are more capable of understanding their
options and are less vulnerable to pressure or coercion. Similarly, if the patients have
health insurance, they will not be financially pressured. The data, however, does not
support this assumption. According to the most recent data reports, 100% of AID
participants in Oregon111 and 97% in Washington were insured,112 and 71.8%113
and 76%114 had at least a college-level education.115 However, these patient

103. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 ( 1997 ); Sulmasy et al., supra note 51, at 1396.
104. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.810 ( 2022 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.3( b )( 3 ) ( West
2022 ); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.030 ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-104( 2 ) ( 2016 ); D.C. CODE
§ 7-661.02( b )( 1 ) ( 2017 ); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-3 (West 2019 ); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18,
§ 5283( a ) ( 2013 ); 2021 N.M. Laws 132 § 3(H); N.J. STAT . A NN . § 26:16-5 ( West 2019 );
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 22, § 2140( 5 )( C ) ( 2019 ).
108. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.830 (2022 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5(a )( 2 ) ( West
2022 ); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.070 ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-110 (2016 ); D.C. CODE
§ 7-661.03( a )( 9 ) ( 2017 ); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327L-7 (West 2019 ); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18,
§ 5283( a )( 5 )( C ) ( 2013 ); 2021 N.M. Laws 132 § 2(C); N.J. STAT . A NN . § 26:16-7 ( West 2019 );
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 17-A § 2140( 9 ) ( 2019 ).
109. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815 (2020 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5(a )( 4 ) ( West
2022 ); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.040( 1 )( d ) ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-106(1 )( g ) ( 2016 );
D.C. CODE § 7-661.03(a )( 1 )( C ) ( 2017 ); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18, § 5283(a )( 5 )( D ) (2013 ); 2021
N.M. Laws 132 § 2( D ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-6 ( West 2019 ); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 22,
§ 2140(6 )( E ) ( 2019 ).
110. Tucker, supra note 7, at 1604.
111. OR. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 92, at 10.
112. WASH. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 95, at 5.
113. OR. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 92, at 9.
114. WASH. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 95, at 8.
115. Similarly, 89.9% of California AID participants had insurance and 74.4% had at least a
college-level education. CAL. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 97, at 7, 9. Seventy-eight percent of Colorado
AID participants had at least a college-level education. COLO. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 4–5.
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characteristics are not dispositive: despite their insurance and education, 53.1% of
participants in Oregon and 58.6% of participants in Washington felt they were a
burden on their family or their caregivers.116 Although the main reasons individuals
in these states—the only states to report on the reasons AID was pursued—sought
out AID was a loss of autonomy (93.1% in Oregon and 89.6% in Washington) and
the loss of ability to engage in activities making life enjoyable (94.3% in Oregon and
90.6% in Washington),117 53.1% and 58.6% are significant numbers, reflecting a
genuine concern that the system may not be properly protecting patients from
undue influences.118
Physicians echo the concerns raised by analysis of the data. While physicians
are required to inform their patients of their diagnosis, prognosis, the feasible
alternatives to assisted suicide, the risks of the lethal medication, and the
probable result of taking said medication,119 there is no guidance for physicians on
explaining how different EOL options can address the patients’ specific EOL
concerns. For instance, physicians are not trained to communicate how palliative
care may alleviate pain or how hospice care may make patients feel like less of a
burden.120 In addition to the lack of guidance, there is no oversight or review of
patient-physician interactions to ensure adequate informing occurs.121
Therefore, even highly educated patients could remain ignorant as to the
alternative EOL options available.122
Further, although physicians are the best suited to inform patients about their
EOL options (even if not all physicians are knowledgeable about the details), they
do not have the knowledge necessary to determine whether there are undue familial
or financial influences on the patient.123 For instance, there have been cases where
insurance companies favor covering AID over alternative treatments.124 Physicians
The other states that reported this data had a small sample size, so I have not included the information
here, as the above-listed data is representative of the trends.
116. OR. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 92, at 12; WASH. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 95, at 10.
Oregon and Washington were the only states that collected and published data about the reasons
patients sought out AID.
117. OR. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 92, at 12; WASH. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 95, at 10.
118. See Preston, supra note 93, at 71–72. But see Battin, supra note 7, at 104 (arguing the data
collected from Oregon shows there is no adverse effect on vulnerable groups ).
119. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815( 1 )( c ) (2020 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5( a )( 2 )
( West 2022 ); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.040(1 )( c ) ( 2009 ).
120. But see Hendin & Foley, supra note 15, at 1619 ( arguing available hospice care inadequately
treats pain of terminally ill patients, meaning hospice care may not be a feasible alternative without
physician intervention or systemic improvements ).
121. Hendin and Foley also articulate a concern that physicians may “merely go through the
motions of presenting the possibility of palliative care for their patients,” rather than engage in a
meaningful explanation. Hendin & Foley, supra note 15, at 1616, 1618 ( describing a conversation where
a physician discussed alternative options in only three sentences and did not address patient anxieties
about those treatments ).
122. See Orentlicher, Pope & Rich, supra note 60, at 260.
123. Sulmasy et al., supra note 51, at 1396.
124. See Hetzler et al., supra note 14, at 581 ( showing that forty-six percent of respondent
physicians agreed that health insurance companies would cover assisted dying over more expensive,
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have no way to know about these insurance decisions unless the patient tells them.
Therefore, even insured patients may be financially pressured to seek AID over
other EOL options.
Similarly, there is no government oversight of the administration of
medication—there is no requirement that independent witnesses be present when
the patient takes the drugs, though the statutes recommend it.125 The concern is that
this lack of oversight makes the AID procedure subject to abuse, as there is no way
to guarantee the patients took the medication free of external pressure.126 Physicians
are ill-equipped to screen for these external influences, especially if the individual is
a new patient, as circumstances beyond the patients’ health are outside the scope of
the physician’s role.127
Additionally, physicians participating in AID do not have a longstanding
relationship with all their patients. Rather, some patients seek out the doctor
specifically to request AID, and so have only two conversations with the physician.
Oregon records the average duration of the patient-physician relationship. In 2020,
the median length of the physician-patient relationship was eight weeks, ranging
from a minimum of less than one week to a maximum of nineteen years.128
Washington also used to record this information, though the most recent data
summaries from 2019 and 2020 do not include it. However, in its 2018 report,
Washington notes that 49.5% of patients had a relationship with their physician that
was less than twenty-five weeks (118 of 238); 10.5% had relationships twenty-five
to fifty-one weeks (25 of 238); and 37.8% (90 of 238) had a patient-physician

alternative treatments ); see also Berger & Terry, supra note 91. But see Refuting Misinformation About
Death with Dignity, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://deathwithdignity.org/refuting-misinformation/
[ https://perma.cc/MV93-28GW ] ( last visited Aug. 26, 2022 ).
125. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815( g ) ( 2020 ) ( stating that a physician should “counsel the
patient about the importance of having another person present when the patient takes the medication,”
but not requiring it ). See generally Margaret K. Dore, “Death with Dignity”: A Recipe for Elder Abuse and
Homicide ( Albeit Not by Name), 11 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR 387 ( 2010 ).
126. Berger & Terry, supra note 91. However, the data shows that even though a witness is not
required, health care providers are commonly present at the time of ingestion and death. For instance,
in Oregon, around half of participants had a health care provider or volunteer present at time of death.
OR. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 92, at 12. Washington’s 2018 Data Summary reports that 77% of
participants had some health care provider present. CTR FOR HEALTH STAT., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF
HEALTH, 2018 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT REPORT 13 ( 2019 ). California reports 47.9% of
participants had a health care provider present at ingestion. CAL. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 97, at 6.
Thus, the fact that witnesses are not required for ingestion is a problem that varies in severity across
state lines. Still, the reality that half of the patients ingesting lethal medication do so without an official
witness provides opportunities for abuse, which physicians can only counter if they are present.
127. Preston, supra note 93, at 74, 75 (“It is questionable, however, whether [ doctors ] are
best-placed to make judgments such as whether an applicant for assisted suicide has a settled wish to
die or is free from pressure.” ); Sulmasy et al., supra note 51, at 1396 ( “Yet most doctors have limited
knowledge of their patients’ lives beyond the examination room—for example, what family dynamics
are at work or what internal pressures may exist.” ).
128. OR. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 92, at 12.
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relationship longer than one year.129 Washington reports that the minimum duration
was less than one week, and the maximum was twenty-three years.130
Because the average physician-patient relationship within the context of
AID is relatively short, most physicians cannot accurately determine whether the
patient is being pressured to seek AID.131 Nevertheless, the current system requires
that physicians determine issues such as “what family or other dynamics might
be at work in the background”132 without giving any guidance on how precisely
to do so. In the cases where vulnerable populations are faced with external familial
or financial pressures, the choice to seek out AID “becomes more like a duty to
die.”133 It is this abuse of the system that the state has an interest in preventing
through regulation.
Finally, physicians have raised concerns about the protection of another
vulnerable population: the mentally ill. Not all physicians have the expertise needed
to identify when a patient is suffering from depression or another psychiatric
illness.134 Knowing when a patient is depressed is important because “it is
potentially reversible” and may affect the patient’s decision to seek AID.135 Studies
show that depression is correlated with an interest in assisted suicide.136 Under the
current AID legislation, being depressed does not automatically make a patient
ineligible for AID: finding that a patient is depressed “does not necessarily mean
that the patient is incompetent.”137 Mental competence, or capability, is separate
from mental-health status. Oregon defines mental capability as whether a patient
“has the ability to make and communicate health care decisions” to the physician.138

129. CTR FOR HEALTH STAT., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 2018 DEATH WITH DIGNITY
ACT REPORT 12 ( 2019 ).
130. Id.
131. Hendin & Foley, supra note 15, at 1626 ( “How can any physician be sure there is
no coercion unless the physician has met the family and seen the interaction among them and with
the patient?” ).
132. Preston, supra note 93, at 74.
133. Id.
134. Hetzler et al., supra note 14, at 581 ( showing that only 23% of physicians agree they are
sufficiently trained to screen for depression ); Battin, supra note 7, at 123–25 ( discussing the debate
regarding whether physicians are competent to screen for depression ).
135. Ilana Levene & Michael Parker, Prevalence of Depression in Granted and Refused Requests
for Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: A Systematic Review, 37 J. MED. ETHICS 205, 205 ( 2011 ).
136. Hendin & Foley, supra note 15, at 1621, 1630–31; Hetzler et al. supra note 14, at 582. See
generally Levene & Parker, supra note 135.
137. Hendin & Foley, supra note 15, at 1631 (quoting TASK FORCE TO IMPROVE THE CARE OF
TERMINALLY-ILL OREGONIANS, THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 30 ( Kathleen Haley & Melinda Lee eds., 1st ed. 1998 ) ).
138. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800( 3 ) ( 2020 ). A 2015 study determined which characteristics of
patients were considered the most important by psychiatrists in AID evaluations. Shara M. Johnson,
Robert J. Cramer, Brett O. Gardner & Matt R. Nobles, What Patient and Psychologist Characteristics Are
Important in Competency for Physician-Assisted Suicide Evaluations?, 21 PSYCH., PUBLIC POL’Y & L. 420,
420 ( 2015 ). A patient’s cognitive ability, their appreciation of the situation ( their rational understanding
of the disorder and treatment ), and their reasoning ( the process by which the patient makes a decision )
were significant predictors of a competence decision. Id. at 427–28.
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Similarly, the California Act defines the “capacity to make medical decisions” as the
“ability to understand the nature and consequences of a health care decision, the
ability to understand its significant benefits, risks, and alternatives, and the ability
to make and communicate an informed decision to health care providers.”139 Being
free from mental illness is not part of the equation. AID statutes recommend
referral to a psychologist or psychiatrist only if the physician believes the patient is
suffering from a psychiatric disorder that may “caus[e] impaired judgment,”140 but
the presence of a psychiatric disorder is not determinative—in other words, just
because a patient is depressed does not automatically mean his or her judgment is impaired.
Unfortunately, “physicians are not reliably able to diagnose depression, let
alone to determine whether depression is impairing judgment.”141 In fact, because
of the relatively short patient-doctor relationship, even psychiatrists doubt their
ability to determine whether a patient is competent to choose AID. In an early
(1999) study of Oregon psychiatrists, only 6% felt confident they could assess
whether a patient’s judgment was impaired in these situations.142 Although this
number may have increased in the last couple decades, the most recent data from
Oregon still reveals worryingly low rates of psychiatric consulting: only 3 of 245
patients (1.2%) were referred for a psychiatric evaluation.143 Colorado similarly
reports that only 3 of 188 patients (1.6%) were referred for a psychiatric
evaluation.144 Washington’s 2020 Data Summary redacted the number of patients
who were referred to psychiatric consulting under its Small Numbers Guidelines,
meaning the amount of patients referred was so small as to be insignificant. In 2018,
10 patients (4%) in Washington were referred for a psychiatric evaluation.145 The
low rate of psychiatric referral is concerning, given the studies that show depression
is linked with an interest in AID.146 It is unknown how many individuals who
ingested lethal medication were suffering from impaired judgment due to a
psychiatric condition because physicians may not be sufficiently trained to
determine such information.
139. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.1( e ) ( West 2022 ).
140. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800( 5 ) ( 2020 ); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.5( a )( 4 ) ( West
2022 ); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.040( 1 )( d ) ( 2009 ); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-48-106(1 )( g ) ( 2016 );
D.C. CODE § 7-661.03( a )( 1 )( C ) ( 2017 ); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5283(a )( 5 )( D ) ( 2013 ); 2021
N.M. Laws 132 § 2( D ); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:16-6 ( West 2019 ); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 2140( 6 )( E ) ( 2019 ). Hawaii is the only AID state that requires a psychiatric evaluation before
prescription. HAW. REV. STAT. § 327L-6 ( West 2019 ).
141. Hendin & Foley, supra note 15, at 1621.
142. Id. at 1623; see also Levene & Parker, supra note 135, at 209; Hiscox, supra note 45, at 200
( “Additional problems arise from the fact that an attending or consulting physician need not have any
training in performing an evaluation [ of mental competence ] . . . . ” ).
143. OR. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 92, at 11. Similarly, Washington reports a 4% referral rate,
and Colorado 2%. WASH. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 95, at 5; COLO. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 96,
at 6.
144. COLO. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 6.
145. WASH. DATA SUMMARY, supra note 95, at 14; CTR FOR HEALTH STAT., WASH. STATE
DEP’T OF HEALTH, 2018 DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT REPORT 12 (2019 ).
146. See sources cited supra note 136.
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In sum, although the state purports to protect vulnerable populations through
legislative safeguards, the requirements it imposes on physicians are illogical and
ineffective. Physicians are ill-equipped to screen AID patients for external
influences that might affect their decision-making due to the short doctor-patient
relationship and the limited knowledge about the patient’s life. Further, not all
physicians have the experience or expertise to screen for depression, meaning there
is an entire vulnerable population that is inadequately protected. The so-called
safeguards have massive holes. Potential gap-filling solutions to these holes will be
discussed in Part III.
D. Preventing a Slippery Slope
Similar to the interest in protecting vulnerable populations, the final state
interest is preventing the extension of AID. The concern is that legislation allowing
AID is only a few legislative amendments away from allowing voluntary or even
involuntary euthanasia.147 Those with this fear point to the Netherlands, where
assisted death and euthanasia laws have gradually become more permissive.148 They
argue this shift is inevitable if AID is legalized. At the basis of this concern is the
belief that the expansion of AID in any way is morally wrong and thus should be
avoided.149 While I will not discuss the moral arguments involved in the slippery
slope discussion, it is important to note the motivation behind this fear and
acknowledge that such a belief—that expansion is wrong—is not universal.150 In
fact, as seen in the Netherlands, many proponents of assisted death “think that the
suffering that a person endures need not be the product of a terminal disease in order
for it to be intolerable . . . [and] would like to see euthanasia and assisted suicide
permitted in . . . a wider range of cases.”151
Regardless of the differing moral views, expansion of AID to euthanasia
continues to be a lively debate within scholarly and legislative circles.152 The Oregon
Death with Dignity Act has been enacted for over two decades and has not
substantially expanded beyond its original structure.153 However, there have been
recent legislative debates about expanding the definition of “self-administer” and
“ingest” to make it easier to qualify, as well as a proposal to include degenerative

147. Sulmasy et al., supra note 51, at 1397.
148. See David Benatar, A Legal Right to Die: Responding to Slippery Slope and Abuse
Arguments, 18 CURRENT ONCOLOGY 206, 206 ( 2011 ); Mary J. Shariff, Assisted Death and the Slippery
Slope—Finding Clarity Amid Advocacy, Convergence, and Complexity, 19 CURRENT ONCOLOGY 143,
144 (2012 ) ( stating that the Netherlands allows euthanasia and AID for both physical and nonphysical
suffering that is unbearable and uncurable, even if not terminal ).
149. See Benatar, supra note 148, at 206.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Lydia S. Dugdale, Barron H. Lerner & Daniel Callahan, Pros and Cons of Physician Aid
in Dying, 92 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 747, 747 (2019 ).
153. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1513.
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conditions in the definition of “terminal.”154 Some scholars also argue that publicity
about AID can increase “suicide contagion,” noting a correlation between increased
rates of suicide per se and AID.155
Analyzing the slippery slope debate in depth is beyond the scope of this Note.
Suffice to say that there are physicians who have concerns regarding suicide
contagion and the expansion of AID procedures.156 It is possible that evolving
societal views on AID may result in a change or expansion of legislation, but such
expansion would be the result of the democratic process—a long, drawn-out
process during which both opponents and proponents have opportunities to be
heard. The use of the democratic process would, ideally, curb any radical or arbitrary
expansion of assisted dying.
As this Part has shown, the state has legitimate interests in its regulation of
AID. The state also has the obligation to ensure the regulations in effect sufficiently
meet these interests while simultaneously protecting the rights of its residents.
Recent surveys of physicians show that the current regulations fail to sufficiently
balance these interests and protect residents seeking AID. The next Part of this
Note suggests some potential solutions to fill the above-listed legislative gaps.
III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS VIA STATE GUIDANCE AND PHYSICIAN TRAINING
Because Supreme Court holdings have authorized states to legalize and
regulate AID, the state has the obligation to ensure the AID procedures are
appropriately structured and reasonably balance the state interests with the
individual’s interest. Unfortunately, the current procedures may not adequately
achieve this balance—lack of oversight has led to a failure to protect vulnerable
individuals seeking AID.
A. Increase State Oversight
The first potential solution would be to increase state oversight of AID. This
could be done by forming a government division or committee dedicated to AID
exclusively. No state that legalized AID has a specific area of the government to
oversee the program. Instead, private physicians conduct assisted suicide for
qualifying patients and submit reports to the state health department.157 The lack of
involvement means the state does not have access to information about how the
procedures are being implemented. The government has extensive discretion to

154. Dugdale, Lerner & Callahan, supra note 152, at 749.
155. See, e.g., Sulmasy et al., supra note 51, at 1396.
156. See, e.g., Dugdale, Lerner & Callahan, supra note 152.
157. This self-reporting structure is another concern in and of itself, as there is no way for the
state to ensure reports are true and accurate, and no way for the state to enforce compliance. Hiscox,
supra note 45, at 205 (“Arguably the biggest cause for concern lies in the fact that the system remains
one of self-reporting and therefore the total incidence of abuse is not only unknown but unknowable,
as is the true extent of [ physician assisted suicide].” ).
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regulate the medical field, including AID,158 and could monitor the use of AID
more closely.159 Creating a specific government division dedicated to AID
regulation, monitoring, and enforcement would allow states to analyze the gathered
data more closely, identify areas of concern in the current legislation, and take more
efficient steps to fix problems.
Creating a specific governmental division is not a novel idea; in California, the
Department of Public Health has six subdivisions, called Centers, which then also
have subdivisions that deal with specific programs.160 For instance, within the
Center for Family Health there is a Genetic Disease Screening Program, a division
dedicated to identifying and treating genetic and congenital disorders in
newborns.161 This division further has three internal sections dedicated to the
Program’s mission. Such a structural organization would be incredibly helpful for
regulating AID procedures: a separate division within the department of health of
each state could create AID regulations, monitor implementation, and enforce
reporting requirements. Allocating resources and personnel to AID programs
specifically would allow states to keep a closer eye on implementation to ensure the
legislation is achieving the ideal balance.
Increased state oversight could include surveying physicians about how many
requests for AID were made, how many were denied, the reasons for denial, and
whether those who were denied sought out a different physician.162 Gathering data
on denial of AID would increase transparency regarding the decision-making
process.163 Analyzing reasons for denial of AID would allow states to determine
how efficient physicians are at screening patients’ eligibility and note any areas
where the rate of or reasons for denials are inconsistent across different physicians.
This additional data could give insight into the potential for “doctor shopping,”
where patients request AID medication from multiple physicians before finding one
willing to prescribe it.164
Increased oversight could also include more detailed reporting requirements
from physicians. Currently, physicians fill out a simple compliance form that
requires them to check boxes to confirm the patient meets all criteria, including

158. Hendin & Foley, supra note 15, at 1637; Preston, supra note 93, at 71 ( “A fundamental
problem here is the absence of an independent qualitative audit system . . . . [ T]here is no body charged
specifically with scrutinizing the quality of the [ physician ] assessment process.” ).
159. Hiscox, supra note 45, at 202 ( arguing the Oregon Department of Health should review
the practice of AID more rigorously to ensure compliance ).
160. California Department of Public Health ( CDPH ) Programs, CAL. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH,
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs [ https://perma.cc/N8HK-65P2 ] ( last visited Sept. 1, 2022 ).
161. Genetic Disease Screening Program, C AL . D EP ’T PUB . H EALTH (Nov. 17, 2021 ),
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CFH/DGDS/Pages/GDSP-Program-and-Services.aspx
[ https://perma.cc/MY3Z-6NDW ].
162. Hendin & Foley, supra note 15, at 1637; Hiscox, supra note 45, at 206.
163. Hiscox, supra note 45, at 206.
164. See id. at 209–10.

First to Printer_Warwick.docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

9/25/2022 6:24 PM

PHYSICIAN’S ROLE IN PHYSICIAN AID-IN-DYING

1435

being fully informed of the “feasible alternatives.”165 The form requires that the
patient is fully informed of his or her diagnosis and prognosis, the potential risks of
AID, the probable result of AID, and the alternatives to AID, such as comfort care,
hospice care, and pain control.166 Some forms do not even include this informed
consent requirement.167 Increased oversight could include adding more detail to this
reporting form, such as adding a checklist that contains material information on the
alternative EOL options that the physician would have to discuss with the patient
during the consultation. This addition would help the state make sure patients are
receiving all essential information before making their final decision. The form
could also include more detailed requirements to ensure the patient is acting
voluntarily, such as requiring the physician to discuss familial and financial reactions
to and repercussions of AID.
B. Require Continuing Medical Education Related to EOL Care
The second potential solution would be to require additional continuing
education for participating physicians to keep them up to date on EOL options and
treatment for terminally ill patients. Currently, only California and Oregon include
continuing medical education (CME) requirements on the topic of treatment for
terminally ill patients.168 California has a one-time requirement that physicians
complete twelve CME credits on pain management and EOL care.169 However, this
requirement can be met by either CME on treatment for terminally ill patients or by
a CME course on the treatment for opiate-dependent patients.170 The Oregon
Medical Board requires one hour of continuing education on pain management

165. OR. DEP’T OF HEALTH, ATTENDING PHYSICIAN’S COMPLIANCE FORM ( 2022 ), https://
www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/
Documents/at1form.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4USZ-FE48 ]; WASH. DEP’T OF HEALTH, ATTENDING
PHYSICIAN’S COMPLIANCE FORM ( 2022 ), https://www.doh.wa.gov/portals/1/Documents/Pubs/
422-064-AttendingPhysicianComplianceForm.pdf [ https://perma.cc/JC56-KH9Y]; CAL. DEP’T OF
PUB. HEALTH, ATTENDING PHYSICIAN’S CHECKLIST & COMPLIANCE FORM, https://www.cdph.ca.gov/
Programs/CHSI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/EOL_Attending_Physician_Checklist_and_Compliance
_Form.pdf [ https://perma.cc/3L93-TBVW ] (last visited Sept. 1, 2022 ).
166. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 165.
167. See, e.g., C OLO . D EP ’ T OF P UB . H EALTH & E NVIRON ., A TTENDING P HYSICIAN
W HO P RESCRIBES M EDICAL A ID - IN -D YING M EDICATION R EPORTING F ORM ( 2018 ),
https://cdphe.colorado.gov/center-for-health-and-environmental-data/registries-and-vital-statistics/
medical-aid-in-dying#Reporting [ https://perma.cc/HW92-LDWC ].
168. State CME Requirements, MEDSCAPE ( Jan. 2019 ), https://www.medscape.org/public/
staterequirements [ https://perma.cc/DB6H-2XJ5 ]. Some states require CME on topics of
pain management, palliative care, or prescribing controlled substances, but do not directly require
CME on the topic of EOL care for the terminally ill. Id; see also David E. Weissman,
End-of-Life Physician Education: Is Change Possible?, 1 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 401, 401 ( 1998 )
( “[ C]ontinuing medical education ( CME ) programs aimed at improving end-of-life practice behavior
are virtually nonexistent.” ).
169. See State CME Requirements, supra note 168; Continuing Medical Education, MED. BD. CAL.,
https://www.mbc.ca.gov/Licensees/Continuing_Education/#Pain [ https://perma.cc/ZG78-4F8C]
( last visited Sept. 1, 2022 ).
170. Continuing Medical Education, supra note 169.
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every two years, but does not require CME on EOL care.171 A related administrative
rule states that education in pain management can be satisfied by CME in pain
management or EOL care.172 Because the physicians can fulfill the requirement in
alternative ways, there is no guarantee that physicians are educated and up to date
on EOL care.173 This could have a detrimental effect on AID implementation, as
physicians are responsible for ensuring AID patients make an informed decision,
which includes knowing alternative EOL options. If the physician is not
knowledgeable about EOL options, then there is no way to guarantee the patient
will be informed, undermining an important legislative safeguard.
To address this lack of physician education, state legislatures could coordinate
with medical boards to require participating physicians to complete additional CME
courses on EOL care and treatment for terminally ill patients.174 The additional
courses could count toward the required CME credits but would be required every
renewal period, rather than only once.
Additional CME courses specifically on AID procedures and implementation
could also be offered or required for participating physicians. These courses could
address the topics of informed consent (including what information the patient
needs to know), the possibility of external undue influences, potential depression or
impaired judgment, and any other facts about implementation that would be helpful
for physicians.175
C. Publish Screening Guides
Finally, the state could promulgate guidance for physicians regarding how to
screen for undue influence, pressures, and potentially depressed patients.176 There
is no data about how physicians are meant to screen for depression, so providing
specific guidelines would increase certainty and transparency about the AID
process. This could take the form of specific questionnaires meant to diagnose
depression. For example, the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) is a common
screening tool for depression.177 It is a relatively short questionnaire, asking nine

171. Continuing Education, OR. MED. BD., https://www.oregon.gov/omb/Topics-of-Interest/
Pages/Continuing-Education.aspx [ https://perma.cc/P7FB-UKZB ] ( last visited Aug. 26, 2022 ).
172. OR. ADMIN. R. 409-050-0130 ( 2011 ), https://secure.sos.state.or.us/oard/viewSingleRule.action?
ruleVrsnRsn=82144 [ https://perma.cc/EQ88-3Y8Y].
173. See generally Amy M. Sullivan, Matthew D. Lakoma & Susan D. Block, The Status of Medical
Education in End-of-Life Care, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 685, 688 (2003 ) ( showing results of a
survey of medical students, residents, and faculty that show “few students and residents received, and
few faculty provided, formal end-of-life education or training” ).
174. See Weissman, supra note 168, for a discussion on how changing CME programs should
be approached.
175. See generally Kathryn L. Tucker, Aid in Dying: Guidance for an Emerging End-of-Life Practice,
142 CHEST J. 218 ( 2012 ).
176. Orentlicher, Pope, & Rich, supra note 60, at 260 (“A number of mental health screening
assessments are available for physicians to use in the office. For example, the Patient Health
Questionnaire (PHQ-9 ) is a validated instrument for detecting and diagnosing depression.” ).
177. Douglas M. Maurer, Screening for Depression, 85 AM. FAMILY PHYSICIAN 139, 141 ( 2012 ).
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questions and taking around five minutes to complete, that has demonstrated high
levels of accuracy in identifying mood disorders in adults.178 There is also a
depression-screening questionnaire targeted to adults older than sixty-five that may
be applicable in AID contexts. This is the Geriatric Depression Scale, and there are
versions with five, fifteen, and thirty questions.179 These questionnaires also have
high levels of accuracy and sensitivity.180 In AID legislation, states could require that
doctors use these or equivalent screening tools with every patient before writing a
prescription, even if there is no indication of mental illness. The questionnaires
could not take the place of a psychiatric referral, as physicians do not have the
expertise to substitute their judgment for that of a psychiatrist. Rather, a
questionnaire meant to diagnose depression could serve as a screening device,
identifying patients who should be referred to psychiatrists for evaluation.
The state could also mandate psychiatric evaluation for every patient, but it is
unclear whether such an action would be advisable and/or cost-effective.
Mandatory psychiatric evaluations would make a long process even longer, making
it more likely that patients would die before receiving a prescription. There is also
no guarantee that a single psychiatric visit would be sufficient to determine legal
mental competency.181
Similar guidance and screening tools could be used to detect undue influence.
In 2016, scholars in California developed the California Undue Influence Screening
Tool (CUIST) to determine whether an individual is experiencing external
pressures.182 The CUIST screens for four things: (1) the individual’s vulnerability,
which includes physical health problems, emotional distress, or isolation; (2) the
influencer’s authority or position of power, which includes whether the influencer
has access to or control over the individual’s property; (3) the influencer’s actions
or tactics, such as whether the influencer manipulates the individual through false
promises, isolation, or control over access to information; and (4) potential unfair
or improper outcomes, such as economic loss and physical or mental
deterioration.183 The CUIST is meant to identify undue influences on an individual
through a conversation. While some of the items on the CUIST may be
outside physicians’ expertise (such as the legal status of the influencer or the tactics
used), there is no reason physicians cannot use this tool as a preliminary screening
method. Further, physicians could receive training in how to use this tool as part of
their CME requirements. Alternatively, states could modify the CUIST to better
178. Id. at 141–42.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Levene & Parker, supra note 135, at 209.
182. Mary Joy Quinn, Lisa Nerenberg, Adria E. Navarro & Kathleen H. Wilber, Developing an
Undue Influence Screening Tool for Adult Protective Services, 29 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 157, 157
( 2017 ); Megan Richelsoph, Undue Influence and Financial Exploitation, 42 BIFOCAL 32, 32 ( 2020 ).
183. CAL. ELDER JUST. COAL. CALIFORNIA UNDUE INFLUENCE SCREENING TOOL ( CUIST )
( 2016 ), https://www.elderjusticecal.org/uploads/1/0/1/7/101741090/final_cuist_5-27-2016_12.4.18.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/TWW2-8ZDJ ].
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align with physicians’ expertise while retaining the essential elements of the
screening tool.
If these additional oversight regulations are implemented, there will be more
certainty that individuals seeking AID are doing so freely and fully informed about
their decision. This will satisfy the state interest in preserving life and protecting
vulnerable populations. It will also allow the individual’s interest in autonomy in
dying to be carefully balanced against the state interests. These additional reporting
and training requirements would also address scholars’ and physicians’ concerns
with implementation of AID regulations without placing additional burdens on the
patients themselves.
CONCLUSION
The debate regarding the adequacy of AID procedures has been ongoing for
decades, yet little real change has happened. This could be due to the passionate
advocacy on both sides, which results in a stalemate of sorts. The inadequacy of the
data collected also results in differing interpretations, making it difficult to form a
decisive conclusion on whether the safeguards are adequate or not.184 This
indecisiveness makes it more difficult to advocate for changes to the procedures.
Yet, by analyzing physician opinions on AID procedures, it is clear the medical field
is not satisfied with the current safeguards. Because AID is predominantly a medical
procedure and physicians have the most experience with implementation, physician
concerns should be seriously considered and addressed by state legislatures.
Many scholars have argued that AID legislation’s reporting requirements are
insufficient and believe more extensive reporting would help prevent abuse of
AID.185 While there is no doubt additional reporting would give the state more
information on which to base review of AID, reporting will not change the
inadequacy of physician education and training. Certain judgments are simply
outside physician expertise, such as screening for depression and influences, and the
average physician is not required to be an expert on EOL care.186 Therefore, to truly
fill the gaps in the legislation, the state should require both additional reporting and
additional education for physicians. This Note attempts to provide a starting point
on which further educational, training, and reporting suggestions could build.

184. See generally Battin, supra note 7; Tucker, supra note 7. But see Hendin & Foley, supra note 15;
Sulmasy et al., supra note 51; Hetzler et al., supra note 14.
185. Hiscox, supra note 45, at 202; Dore, supra note 125.
186. Hendin & Foley, supra note 15; Sulmasy et al., supra note 51; Hetzler et al., supra note 14.

